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Abstract 
This paper examines the effects of early childhood nutrition on schooling inputs 
and outcomes to assess the dynamic nature of human capital production, using panel data 
from South Africa.  Height-for-age Z-score is used as a measure of health and nutritional 
status in early childhood.  Based on a comparison of siblings, this analysis concludes that 
improving children’s health significantly lowers the age when they start school, increases 
grade attainment, and decreases grade repetition in the early stage of schooling.  
However, this positive effect diminishes at later stages.  The results also show that 
households allocate more of their resources (such as school fee expenditure) to healthy 
children at the early stage, although wealthier households may invest more in less well 
endowed children in an attempt to reduce sibling inequality.  However, fewer resources 
are allocated to healthy children at later stages.  By the time of transition from primary to 
secondary school, the healthy child can increase household income by seeking 
employment in the labor market.  In other words, while health capital augments the 
efficiency of investment in schooling at the early stage, it may increase opportunity costs 
at the later stage, which may deter investment in schooling. 
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1.  Motivations 
Human capital takes a long time to accumulate, going through multiple phases 
from early childhood through higher education.  While nutritional intake in early 
childhood forms the basis of a child’s health capital, which provides a foundation for 
subsequent child development,
1 investments in schooling augment the child’s knowledge 
capital, which is directly rewarded in advanced labor markets and technologies.  In this 
paper, we examine the effects of nutritional status and health capital in early childhood 
on schooling investments and outcomes, using recently available panel data from South 
Africa. 
The dynamic process of human capital development creates the possibility that 
investments in early childhood will influence the optimal amount and effectiveness of 
investments at later stages (Cunha et al. 2004).  Some recent studies attempt to identify 
the causality from early-childhood nutritional status to schooling outcomes (see, for 
example, Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey 2002; Glewwe, Jacoby, and King 2001).  In 
general, the way that early-stage human capital investments determine the subsequent 
path of human capital accumulation and future income depends on (1) whether 
investments in different stages are mutual complements or substitutes, and (2) the extent 
to which early investments and outcomes alter the environment, information, and 
preferences of children and parents that affect investment decisions at later stages. 
To answer the question of whether early investments in children affect future 
outcomes requires a good understanding of rather complex interactions of market forces 
and dynamic household behavior.  First, health capital, as well as schooling investments, 
generates positive economic returns, especially in the developing-country context 
(Strauss 1986; Haddad and Bouis 1991; Thomas and Strauss 1997).  Therefore, health 
                                                 
1 For comprehensive discussion of the problem of child malnutrition in economic development, see 
Behrman, Alderman, and Hoddinott (2004). 2 
capital may increase opportunity costs for schooling investments,
2 and it may affect 
intertemporal decisionmaking, creating nonlinearity in the effect of health capital on 
schooling investments. 
Second, there is a technical relationship between health and schooling in the 
dynamic human capital production function.  For example, if health capital
3 is an input in 
the schooling production function (for example, enabling children to attend classes every 
day), whether health capital augment the productivity of schooling investments or it 
substitutes for schooling inputs, it affects the optimal level of schooling investments.  In 
the former case, we predict a cumulative process of widening inequality among siblings, 
given differences in nutritional status and health capital in early childhood, since more 
knowledge capital is invested in healthy children.  If parents are averse to sibling 
inequality in the future earnings, they will make more schooling investment in unhealthy 
children. 
Third, parents also learn about potential returns to schooling investments from 
outcomes of early-stage investments (in nutritional status and health in our context) and 
make decisions regarding optimal investments at later stages.  In these decisions, parents’ 
preferences concerning sibling inequality in human capital and future income matter.  If 
parents are averse to the inequality among their children, they may increase investments 
in schooling of their less well-endowed children to equalize future incomes among their 
children (Quisumbing, Estudillo, and Otsuka 2003).  In the context of dynamic human 
capital production, since outcomes of early-childhood investments signal the expected 
outcomes of investment at a later stage, parents can react to those signals by changing 
late-stage investments to maximize their objective. 
                                                 
2 For example, with a relatively small sample of 367 adult workers (age above 20) in the KwaZulu-Natal 
Income Dynamics Study 1998, returns to height (measured in centimeters) are estimated as 0.0093 (t-value: 
2.04) in the log-wage equation.  Returns to schooling (in years) are 0.1055 (t-value:  8.26).  The 
specification includes age, male dummy, and community fixed effects.  Robust standard errors are used 
with community-level clusters. 
3 Health capital is part of human capital, measuring physical development and conditions in children 
(height, weight, and if the child is sick or well), but not including endowment such as in-born differences in 
intelligence. 3 
To empirically assess this issue, we encounter a few challenging problems even 
with longitudinal data of children.  The first problem arises from potential endogeneity of 
nutritional status, such as fixed household-specific unobserved factors that affect both 
child health capital and schooling decisions, creating a positive correlation between them.  
To eliminate this problem, our approach requires household fixed effects, which base 
inferences on (often small) sibling variations.
4 
5 
The next section describes the model.  Human capital accumulation is modeled as 
a sequential process in which health is formed at an early stage and schooling investment 
is undertaken given the health outcomes.  Both health and knowledge (education) capital 
determine earnings in the labor market.  Section 3 discusses econometric issues, focusing 
on specification and identification strategy. 
Data and variables are described in Section 4.  To measure schooling outcomes, 
we use the 2004 KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (Round 3), which collected 
individual-level information such as enrollment, age schooling started, grade completed, 
grades repeated, and expenditures from children aged 7 to 20.  To supplement the main 
analysis, the survey also used the results of simple mathematics tests given to children 
                                                 
4 The literature offers a few qualified empirical studies, which solve the above problems.  Using 
longitudinal data for children from Zimbabwe, Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey (2002) use civil war and 
drought periods that affected growth in children below three years to identify the effect of early childhood 
malnutrition on schooling in a maternal fixed effect model.  This identification strategy is based on findings 
that income shocks, such as drought and flood, in credit constrained circumstances, change consumption, 
which affects child growth (Hoddinott and Kinsey 2001; Foster 1995).  Glewwe, Jacoby, and King (2001) 
take a similar approach to sibling estimation, using longitudinal data of Filipino children, but their 
identification strategy uses a rather strong assumption on height changes among older and younger siblings.  
Alderman et al. (2000) use price data, interacted with parents’ education and child gender, as instruments 
for child height growth in Pakistan. 
5 An earlier version uses the unique period in South Africa from the end of apartheid to the beginning of a 
democratic regime in the province of KwaZulu Natal.  The country introduced the first democratic election 
in 1994, but the implementation of the local election was delayed one year in KwaZulu-Natal due to violent 
political conflicts and social turmoil.  This period is also the start of widening economic and political 
opportunities for African populations, who were neglected during apartheid.  These transitions seem to 
have exogenously affected the welfare of sample households, though the magnitude and direction of the 
changes depend on the community in which they resided as well as their initial income level.  The sample 
of children in the longitudinal data from the province of KwaZulu Natal include children below the age of 
three in 1994 and 1995, whose physical growth is regarded as sensitive to nutrition intakes.  However, it is 
shown that the instruments constructed are not statistically effective enough to correct for individual bias.  4 
age 7 to 9 to measure their learning performance.  Therefore, combined with the 
information on nutrition and health outcomes for children ages 1 to 5 available in the 
1998 survey, we can investigate the effect of early childhood nutrition on schooling 
investments and outcomes of children 6 years and above.  One advantage of focusing on 
early stages of schooling is the high enrollment rate at the primary school level, which 
minimizes a selectivity problem arising from child time allocation decisions at later 
stages of schooling. 
Section 5 summarizes empirical results.  First, data for siblings showing the 
effects of nutrition (as indicated by height) on the age schooling started and the grade 
completed show that for the majority, children of normal height (as measured by height-
for-age Z-score) start school earlier, complete more grades, and repeat fewer grades.  The 
analysis also identifies some outlying observations among taller children (less than 5 
percent of the sample) that show a negative effect of the height Z-score on schooling 
outcomes.  In the analysis with longer panel data (11 years), we find that, although better 
nutrition and health status in early childhood improves primary school outcomes, this 
positive effect diminishes as the child moves from primary to secondary school. 
Second, the analysis on mathematics test results, using the sample of children age 
7 to 9, shows that health capital, measured by height at early childhood, has a 
significantly positive effect among children age 7, implying that early-childhood nutrition 
affects learning performance at the very early stage of transition to schooling.  
Comparison of naïve—ordinary least squares (OLS)—and sibling estimates also 
demonstrates that some (unobserved) household factors improve both child health and 
learning performance.  Similarly, our results suggest that household-specific 
unobservables are positively correlated with schooling investments and early childhood 
health capital. 
Third, the information on individual-level school fee expenditure enables us to 
investigate intrahousehold resource allocation among siblings.  We find that more 
resources are allocated to shorter (less healthy) children in the early stage of primary 
school (thus reducing inequality), but this increases inequality at later stages. 5 
2.  A Simple Model 
This section introduces a simple model in which parents decide on how much to 
invest in child health and schooling, resulting in returns to labor.  For simplicity, we treat 
the age distribution of children as exogenous and assume that children enter the labor 
market in the final stage.  Health is formed in the first stage,
6 while schooling investment 
is undertaken in the next stage. 
In the pre-primary stage, per capita consumption determines health capital hj for 
child j, 
 h j = f (c1, z) + εj1, 
where c1 is per capita consumption in the household, z is predetermined household 
characteristics such as parents’ schooling, and εj1 is an idiosyncratic health shock.  For 
simplicity, health capital accumulates only until age a*, when the child enters the 











For simplicity, we assume that c1 = y.  Given that h is child height, c is specifically 
intended to capture nutritional intake. 
At the second stage, knowledge capital, kj, accumulates with schooling 
investments sjt.  The law of motion is given as 
 k j = g(sj, hj, z) + εj2, 
where investment g(sj2, hj, z) has health capital as its argument.  Complementarity 
between schooling and health investments is captured by 
                                                 
6 Nutrition intakes until the age of 3 are regarded as very important in forming child health capital, 
measured by height-for-age Z-score.  Although weight-for-age Z-score fluctuates over time (age) due to 
changes in nutrition intakes (that is, consumption), height-for-age Z-score is less likely to change after the 
age of 3.  In the context of dynamic human capital production, therefore, child health is measured by the 











Household budget constraint is 
  2 () [ ] ii
i
cy w h T sb = +− + ∑ , 
and c1 = y where w(hi) is child wage, T is time endowment for the child, b is saving and 
loan, and y is exogenous household income.  It is assumed that child wage increases with 
health capital, that is, w′(hi) ≥ 0.  It is assumed that the child cannot work at the pre-
primary stage and can work in the labor market only when he or she enters school. 
Several reservations follow.  First, it is assumed that income from siblings, 
parents, and credit are pooled in the household budget and therefore are perfectly 
substitutable.  Second, to describe the income process, the model does not assume a 
production function where adult and child members supply labor inputs that are not 
perfectly substitutable.  This framework is suitable in our empirical setting of South 
Africa, where wage employment (including formal and informal jobs) is a major source 
of income.  Third, the model does not have leisure in the utility function, which is 
imperfectly substitutable between household members (Pitt and Rosenzweig 1990). 
It is also important to note that the income opportunity in the child wage w(h) is 
not necessarily related to labor markets.  It may also capture activities such as childcare 
and self-employment in a family business. 
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7 Cunha et al. (2004) summarize some key concepts in the sequential development of child human capital.  
They focus on cognitive and noncognitive development.  It seems that their analysis does not directly 
include health and nutritional status as part of human capital in child development.  The exclusion of health 
capital from the analysis results in a framework in which they can focus on human capital production 
function and complementarity and substitutability of different inputs (early childhood and schooling stage).  
In this paper, children also work in the labor market where health capital has economic returns. 7 
which captures the discounted sum of expected utilities from consumption over time and 
the final-period returns from children.  Assume that W (ki, hi) is strictly concave in both ki 
and hi.  The concavity of the wage function implies that parents have incentives to 
equalize human capital among their children.
8 



















where λ2 denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the stage-2 budget constraint.  
These conditions provide the schooling function k*(y, hj, z).  At the first stage, the 
problem is trivial, since exogenous income and shocks determine investment in health 
capital.  From these conditions, we define 
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The first term captures the expected marginal return from schooling investment, while the 
second term is the opportunity cost for time spent in school.  Therefore, with a perfect 
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2 c  is such that 
*
2 ()β(1 ) uc r ′ =+ .  Therefore, preference does not actually enter the 
condition.  In this case, parents compare returns and opportunity costs for schooling, and 
child health capital can change both.  Household income does not enter the condition, so 
income level does not affect the optimal schooling and child health does not affect the 
schooling decision. 
                                                 
8 Since household members have no preference for leisure, there is no income effect on labor supply. 8 
If child wage does not increase with health capital (that is, w′(h) = 0), an increase 
in health capital will raise the optimal level of schooling if health and knowledge capital 
are complementary. 
Consider the case that b = 0, where credit opportunity is closed.  Given the 
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The right-hand side captures changes in the opportunity cost and the current liquidity.  
First, an increase in health capital raises the child wage, which discourages schooling 
investment.  Second, an increase in health capital relaxes the current budget constraint, 
given that the child works to make a contribution to the household income.  The 
concavity of the utility function guarantees that the second term is negative, which 
increases schooling investments.
9 
An increase in the income level decreases the marginal utility, so λ2(y). In the first 
term, poverty therefore magnifies the negative effect of health capital on schooling 
investment. If the absolute risk aversion measure is constant, it is easy to show that an 
increase in income weakens the negative effect of health capital on child schooling. 
                                                 
9 An increase in child health capital improves the welfare: 
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where the Envelope theorem was applied to the third term.  Even though we cannot predict the direction of 
the marginal impact of changes in health capital on schooling investments, it is shown that the direct effect 
of an increase in health capital is welfare augmenting. 9 
Interestingly, the effect of other siblings’ health capital on schooling investment 
only exists when the financial market is imperfect.  An improvement in other siblings’ 
health relaxes the budget constraint, which reduces the marginal utility λ2(y).  This does 
not happen when the loan market is perfect. 
We have two conjectures.  First, in the case of the convex return function where 
the second order conditions do not hold, we expect some corner solutions, concentrating 
all schooling investments in some children, leaving no investment to others.  Parents can 
maximize welfare by investing in some children, while ignoring the others.  When health 
capital is complementary to schooling investment, parents concentrate schooling 
investments in well-endowed children, if the labor market wage is constant.  However, 
greater health capital also raises wages (thus, opportunity costs), which decreases 
schooling investments.  If the latter effect is sufficiently small, we expect that the 
inequality in schooling between siblings will diverge.
10 
Second, suppose that children are born in different time periods.  When the timing 
(and the number) of children is exogenous, we have a substitution effect between 
investment in schooling of elder siblings and investment in health of younger siblings, if 
the discount factor is sufficiently large.  In the case of a small discount factor, parents 
may want to invest more in schooling of elder siblings, sacrificing the human capital of 
younger siblings, in order to gain returns to human capital as early as possible.  If elder 
siblings’ time input is important (included) in child health capital production, elder 
siblings can work at home to take care of younger siblings.  In this case, there is a trade-
off between schooling investments in elder siblings and time input in health capital 
formation of younger siblings, which again depends on the discount factor.
11 
                                                 
10 Quisumbing, Estudillo, and Otsuka (2003) presents evidence from the rural Philippines, where boys are 
likely to inherit land, showing that parents invest more in schooling of daughters than sons to equalize 
lifetime earnings between them.  In the Philippines, Schady (2003) and Yamauchi (2005) both show that 
the schooling return function is convex, whereas the latter contrasts this finding to the case of Thailand 
where schooling returns are concave. 
11 Nonneutrality of birth order and sibling’s sex composition in child human capital investment is pointed 
out and analyzed in, for example, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000), Rosenzweig (1986), and Butcher and 
Case (1994). 10 
3.  Empirical Framework 
To assess the effects of children’s health in their early years on schooling 
decisions and outcomes at a subsequent stage, we use the following framework.  The 
schooling equation is 
  11 2 () ijt ijt a ijt ijt i j ijt
a
qh I a a z α ββ γ μ φ ε − =+ + = + +++ ∑ , (1) 
where i, j, and t denote household, child, and time, respectively, and qijt is schooling 
inputs or outcomes, hijt−1 is health capital, which is measured by the height-for-age Z-
score (formed at t − 1), aijt is the age of the child, zijt is a set of control variables, μi is 
household-specific fixed unobservables, φj is child-specific fixed unobservables, and εijt 
is an error term. 
First, it is important to control the heterogeneity that arises from the current ages.  
For example, cumulative years of grades repeated increases (but weakly) as children 
spend more time in school, that is, as their age increases.  The score of the mathematical 
tests also changes by age (and grade completed).  In the analysis below, we assume that 
age structure in the sample of children is exogenous; it is uncorrelated with shocks in 
schooling decisions and outcomes, which justifies the inclusion of age fixed effects. 
Second, since it is highly likely that household-specific unobservables μi are 
correlated with hijt−1, ordinary least square (OLS) estimates of β1 are biased.  This makes 
it necessary to eliminate this component from the errors.  For this purpose, we include 
household fixed effects to control μi.  Therefore, estimation is based on variations across 
siblings in the household.  
In the context of panel analysis, the inclusion of household fixed effects has 
another advantage regarding the attrition bias, which may arise from endogenous 
migration and mortality during the sample period.  Since we only look at variations 
within households, given household observations in the two rounds, we do not have to 11 
control for household-level attrition problems.  Individual-level attritions are investigated 
in Section 4.  
Third, even with household fixed effects, we still encounter a potential problem of 
bias that may arise from a correlation between φj and hijt−1.  To wipe out this correlation, 
it is necessary to use a set of instruments that explains the variations in hijt−1 but is 
uncorrelated with either φj or shocks in schooling investments and outcomes εijt.  
However, the necessity depends on the magnitude of covariations in differences among 
siblings in Z-score and schooling endowments.
12 
Finally, we can examine how parents differentiate among their children in the 
quality of their investments in school fee payments.  It is thought that options depend on 
income level.  Low-income households, most likely to be credit constrained, cannot 
afford to change expenditures for different siblings.  Children from those households are 
likely to attend inexpensive public schools in the neighborhood.  An increase in income 
enables parents to differentiate between their children in school spending.  In this regard, 
it is interesting to see whether parents compensate for less endowed children (those with 
                                                 
12 The instruments used in the analysis below are influenced by a historical event specific to KwaZulu-
Natal, from which our data come.  Prior to 1994, under apartheid, South Africa prohibited freedom in 
various dimensions of social life for African and nonwhite populations.  At the end of apartheid in 1994, 
after violent political struggles, the country held its first democratic national election, except in KwaZulu-
Natal, where the African National Congress and a new political party could not agree to the election.  For 
this reason, KwaZulu Natal had its election one year later in 1995.  That year was marked by turbulence 
and violence in the province. 
An instrument is constructed to have the value of one if children were less than 3 years old (inclusive) 
between the beginning of 1994 and the end of 1995.  Before the age of three is regarded as the period when 
the child’s growth is most sensitive to nutritional intake, which reflects economic conditions.  This 
indicator is interacted with cluster fixed effects to capture possible heterogeneity in the impacts of the 
1994–95 disturbances on child growth, I(Age ≤ 3 in Year = 1994 or 95) × cluster indicators.  This period 
also corresponds to the abolishment of apartheid, so new economic opportunities became open to the 
African population.  Thus there may have been positive impacts as well as negative ones.  In addition, to 
capture the heterogeneity in the impacts related to the initial income level, the indicator is also interacted 
with total monthly household income in 1993. 
Although an F-test supports the joint significance of these instruments in explaining variations among 
siblings in height-for-age Z-scores, a Hausman-Wu test rejects the relevance of these instruments.  We 
observed some differences between sibling OLS and sibling IV estimates, but the magnitude did not change 
the qualitative nature of our results.  Therefore, we do not show sibling IV estimates here and focus on 
sibling OLS estimates in the following discussion. 12 
lower health capital) by spending more on them, or whether they will or concentrate more 
resources on better-endowed children. 
4.  Data 
The analysis requires information from different points in time for the same 
individuals.  In this paper, we use data from the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study 
of 1993, 1998, and 2004.  Population was self-weighted designed in the first round in 
1993, based on the 1991 population census, and enumeration-based weights were 
introduced in 1998).  The 1993 and 1998 surveys provide information on anthropometric 
measures and health outcomes of children, enabling us to construct age-standardized Z-
scores for height.  The 2004 survey provides some detailed information on schooling 
decisions and outcomes.  Our analysis combines the nutritional status of pre-primary 
aged children in 1998 and 1993 and their schooling inputs and outcomes until 2004.
13 
Figures 1a and 1b depict the distribution of height-for-age Z-scores by age in 
1998 and 1993, respectively.  Observations with inconsistent ages between 1993 or 1998 
and 2004 were screened out from the sample.  The sample includes those who were 
enrolled in school.  These figures show symmetric distributions of height Z-scores by age 
group, though small samples seem to affect the smoothness of the empirical distributions. 
In the main analysis, we use as schooling variables:  (1) age started school, 
(2) grade completed (conditional on current age), (3) the number of grades repeated, 
(4) school fee expenditure, and (5) mathematics test results.  For age started school, the 
2004 survey asks for the calendar year in which the child started primary school.  That 
year, compared with the current age in 2004, tells us the age at which the child started 
attending primary school.
14 
                                                 
13 Constructing individual-level panel data from the 1998 and 2004 surveys, we have screened out 
observations recorded in multiple households (multiple memberships).  The details of this procedure are 
available from the author. 
14 In the main analysis, we only use observations with estimated age started school greater or equal to age 
4, restricting the sample to children who were aged less than 3. 13 
Figure 1a—Distributions of height-for-age Z-score in 1998 
 
 




Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of schooling outcome variables:  age 
started school, the highest grade completed, and the cumulative number of grades 
repeated.  First, the age started school increases as the current age increases, which 
suggests that younger cohorts enter school at an earlier age.  Second, the highest grade 
completed and the cumulative number of grades repeated also increase with the current 
age.  Figure 2 also depicts the distribution of individual-level school fee payment.  It is 
highly skewed, with a concentration of low school fee expenditures. 
In the mathematical tests, we implemented four types of numerical tests for 
children age 7 to 9—summation, subtraction, multiplication, and division.  The four14 
Table 1—Descriptive statistics:  Schooling 
Age  Age started  Grades completed  Grades repeated 
6 5.288  (0.756)  0.714  (0.756) 0.143  (0.378) 
7 5.693  (0.922)  0.894  (0.689) 0.256  (0.597) 
8 5.921  (0.829)  1.597  (0.764) 0.366  (0.540) 
9 6.150  (0.989)  2.443  (1.049) 0.343  (0.563) 
10 6.171  (1.064)  3.216  (1.168) 0.552  (0.777) 
11 6.048  (1.434)  4.123  (1.398) 0.628  (0.876) 
12 6.216  (1.470)  5.121  (1.469) 0.609  (0.897) 
13 6.220  (1.281)  6.038  (1.480) 0.616  (0.946) 
14 6.431  (1.322)  6.869  (1.468) 0.711  (0.968) 
15 6.485  (1.282)  7.559  (1.445) 0.925  (1.047) 
16 6.406  (1.399)  8.534  (1.855) 0.776  (1.016) 
17 6.516  (1.511)  9.036  (1.790) 1.195  (1.241) 
18 6.665  (1.951)  9.604  (2.052) 1.227  (1.223) 
19 7.189  (1.772)  9.875  (1.815) 1.263  (1.186) 
20 7.390  (2.140)  9.889  (2.539) 1.188  (1.106) 
Notes:  Means are shown with standard deviations in parentheses.  There are seven observations in the age 
6 group, although KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study Wave 3, Section 12.2 targets children 
aged 7 to 20. 
 




questions are 3 + 5 (summation), 7 − 3 (subtraction), 2 × 6 (product), and 12 ÷ 4 
(division).  Table 2 reports observations with correct and incorrect answers.  Note that the 15 
sample size for each age group is nearly the same.  First, the likelihood of giving a 
correct answer increases as age increases for all four questions.  Second, the difficulty 
increases as we move from summation to division. 
Table 2—Descriptive statistics:  Math results 
  Age group 
  7 year old  8 year old  9 year old 
Number of observations  218  213  205 
Summation      
  Correct  157  186  189 
  Incorrect  61  27  16 
Subtraction      
  Correct  117  157  166 
  Incorrect  101  56  39 
Product      
  Correct  60  98  131 
  Incorrect  158  115  74 
Division      
  Correct  15  44  77 
  Incorrect  203  169  128 
 
 
Table 3 reports the determinants of attritions from the 1998 to the 2004 rounds.  
Since our main analysis focuses on variations among siblings, controlling for household 
fixed effects, attritions at the individual level are of interest.  Given observations in the 
1998 round, our concern here is to determine whether the probability of being observed 
in the 2004 round depends on explanatory variables used in the schooling investment and 
outcome equations.  The sample is restricted to children from households found in 2004 
who were between the ages of 1 and 5 in 1998 with values of height-for-age Z-scores 
between –6 and 6,.,.
15 
Specifications include household fixed effects with initial age and gender 
indicators.  Columns 1 and 2 use household fixed effects based on the 1998 and 2004 
                                                 
15 In the analysis of nutrition-height effects on schooling, we screen out observations of children that show 
inconsistent ages in the two rounds (for example, age 6 in 2004 corresponds to age 0 or 1).  In the analysis 
of age started school, we exclude those who were already enrolled in 1998.  Mostly for the first reason, 
sample size differs between the above attrition analysis and schooling analysis.  Screening observations of 
inconsistent ages between 1998 and 2004 based on the 2004 survey excludes large height-for-age Z-scores 
due to understated age in 1998. 16 
Table 3—Attritions 
  Dependent = 1 if observed in 2004, and 0 otherwise 
  Estimation:  linear probability model 
  1998 to 2004  1993 to 2004 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) 
Height for age Z-score (Haz) 0.0081  0.0045  0.0321  0.0454  0.0126  -0.0220 
 (0.62)  (0.31)  (1.25)  (1.57)  (0.83)  (0.58) 
Age =1 * Haz            0.0372 
           (0.80) 
Age =2 * Haz      -0.0487  -0.0886    0.0201 
     (1.34)  (2.04)    (0.42) 
Age =3 * Haz      -0.0263  -0.0261    0.0747 
     (0.70)  (0.63)    (1.54) 
Age =4 * Haz      -0.0093  -0.0207    0.0562 
     (0.23)  (0.47)    (1.04) 
Age =5 * Haz      -0.0298  -0.0616    0.0226 
     (0.83)  (1.55)    (0.37) 
Age =1          -0.0256  0.0028 
         (0.34)  (0.03) 
Age =2  0.0750  0.1585  0.0466  0.1007  0.0145  0.0221 
 (1.27)  (2.35)  (0.74)  (1.36)  (0.20)  (0.26) 
Age =3  0.0632  0.1125  0.0565  0.1212  -0.0425  0.0265 
 (1.10)  (1.76)  (0.89)  (1.68)  (0.60)  (0.32) 
Age = 4  0.0636  0.0940  0.0730  0.1039  -0.0840  -0.0312 
 (1.08)  (1.40)  (1.11)  (1.39)  (1.12)  (0.33) 
Age =5  0.1176  0.1588  0.1071  0.1236  0.0082  0.0179 
 (1.88)  (2.29)  (1.61)  (1.69)  (0.11)  (0.19) 
Female -0.0503  -0.1069  -0.0529 -0.1126  0.0329  0.0353 
 (1.24)  (2.29)  (1.29)  (2.38)  (0.76)  (0.80) 
Household fixed effects  1998  2004  1998  2004  1998  1998 
Number of observations  516  516  516  516  689  689 
Adjusted R-squared  0.1132 0.1121  0.1036  0.1188  0.2266  0.2218 
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are absolute t-values. Sample consists of children with height for age Z-
score between -6 and 6 in households observed in 2004. There were 45 attritions out of 516 children 
in the period 1998–2004 and 145 attritions out of 689 children in the period 1993 to 2004.  
 
 
households, respectively.  During the six-year interval between the two rounds, 
households were split and young people formed new households.  The analysis in the 
next section uses the 2004 household definition, since decisions regarding child schooling 
are supposed to be made in current household units.  In both cases, age in 1998 affects 
the likelihood of being observed in 2004.  This suggests that child mortality and mobility 
depends on the age of the child.  Columns 3 and 4 include the interactions of Z-scores 
and age in 1998, which again shows that even in each age group, height does not affect 
the attrition probability.  Since age is controlled as a fixed effect in schooling equations, 17 
estimation of equation (1) is robust to attrition bias.  Similarly, Columns 5 and 6 examine 
attritions from 1993 to 2004.  Results confirm that attritions were not associated with 
height-for-age Z-score in 1993 (and interactions with the 1993 age), so we do not have to 
control attrition probability in the following analyses. 
5. Outcomes at the Early Stage of Schooling 
Age Started School 
Table 4 shows the effect of the height-for-age Z-score in 1998 on the age started 
school.  The sample consists of children aged 1 to 3 in 1998.
16  Column 1 controls only 
cluster-level fixed effects, while column 2 reports estimates for siblings.  The 
specifications include current age indicators to control cohort effects.  In column 1, 
greater child height is found to significantly lower the age when the child started school, 
though this estimate is likely to be biased due to a correlation between household-level 
factors and child height. 
Table 4—Age started school 
  Dependent: Age started school 
  (1) (2) 
Height-for-age Z-score 1998  -0.1036  -0.3568 
 (2.99)  (2.75) 
Female -0.0722  -0.0377 
 (0.57)  (0.11) 
Current age fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Cluster fixed effects  Yes   
Household fixed effects    Yes 
R-squared 0.3994  0.9829 
Number of observations  215  215 
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are absolute t-values. Robust standard errors are used in Column 1. Sample consists of 
children aged 1 to 3 in 1998, with consistent ages in 1998 and 2004, height-for-age Z-score in the range of –6 to 
6 in 1998, and age started school equal to or above 4. 
                                                 
16 Since older children are more likely to be already in school than younger children, this selection of the 
sample affects estimated height effects on age started school. If the height effect is positive, those who are 
relatively well endowed are likely to be dropped from the sample, especially among older children (ages 4 
and 5). As a result, the selection biases the estimate upward (smaller in absolute value). 18 
Column 2 confirms the above finding, showing an even greater effect of height on 
age starting school.  The upward bias suggests that household-specific unobservables 
endowment (which increases the child’s age to start school) is positively correlated with 
the height-for-age Z-score.  These results imply that early childhood malnutrition delays 
the age when the child starts school.
17  Current age does not matter in age started school 
(not shown in the table), which suggests that the decision to start primary schooling did 
not change between 1998 and 2004. 
Grade Completed 
Table 5 reports the effects of the height-for-age Z-score on years of schooling 
completed.  Columns 1 and 2 compare estimates with cluster and household fixed effects.  
Though a positive significant effect is found with cluster fixed effects, the effect is 
negative and insignificant with household fixed effects.  In both cases, girls are more 
likely to advance grades than boys. 
To check possible nonmonotonicity, columns 3 and 4 include step functions of 
height-for-age Z-score in different ranges.  Interestingly, an improvement in the height Z-
score significantly increases years of schooling completed, but the effect turns out to be 
negative at large values of the Z-score. 
The negative effect of height on schooling is consistent with increased 
opportunity cost of schooling investment.  However, we also have to take into account 
the possibility that those observations with large Z-scores come from an understatement 
of ages.  As discussed, the number of observations in this range of Z-scores is extremely 
small. 
                                                 
17 A preliminary analysis showed some potential nonmonotonicity in the effect of the height Z-score on age 
started school.  First, estimates of height effects on age started school are significantly negative among 
relatively short children.  Marginal gain in earlier age to start school from increasing height is greater 
among less endowed children.  Second, the numbers of observations in these estimations suggest that the 
effect is negative and significant in more than 95 percent of the sample.  Some outlying observations from 
exceptionally tall children (conditional on age) change the estimates.  This also holds in the analysis of 
grade completion and repetitions. 19 
Table 5—Grade completed 
  Dependent:  Grade completed 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Height for age Z-score 1998 (Haz)  0.0619  -0.0278  0.1090  0.2873 
  (2.11) (0.43) (2.49) (3.30) 
Haz 1 to 2      0.1476  -0.5789 
     (0.61)  (1.35) 
Haz 2 to 3      -0.5716  -1.6777 
     (1.70)  (3.33) 
Haz 3 to 4      -0.3658  -2.9630 
     (0.89)  (4.83) 
Haz 4 to 5      -0.5666  -2.2446 
     (1.45)  (2.79) 
Haz 5 to 6      -1.7554  n.a. 
     (1.90)  
Female  0.2396 0.5316 0.2353 0.5560 
  (2.39) (2.63) (2.39) (3.26) 
Current age fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Cluster fixed effects  yes    yes   
Household  fixed  effects   yes  yes 
R  squared  0.6778 0.9396 0.6864 0.9607 
Number  of  observations  348 348 348 348 
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are absolute t values. Robust standard errors are used in columns 1 and 3. 
Sample consists of children aged 1 to 5 in 1998, consistent with 2004 ages, and height-for-age Z-
score in the range of –6 to 6 in 1998. 
 
The results also show that household endowment is negatively correlated with 
height if the Z-score is smaller than one, but it is positively correlated with height if the 
score is larger.  If the negative effect of height on schooling attainment comes from the 
incentive to work outside school, unobserved household-specific factors (such as parents’ 
knowledge) tend to prevent children from supplying their labor. 
Grade Repetition 
Table 6 summarizes the results on grade repetitions.  The dependent variable is 
the cumulative number of grades repeated.  Columns 1 and 2 show estimates with cluster 
and household fixed effects respectively.  The effect of the height Z-score is insignificant 
in both cases.  Consistent with the previous finding on grades completed, girls experience 
a smaller number of grade repetitions than boys. 20 
Columns 3 and 4 include step functions of the height Z-score to capture possible 
nonlinearity.  Though nonmonotonicity is not detected statistically in the case of cluster 
fixed effects, sibling estimation demonstrates convexity.  For those who are relatively 
stunted, an improvement in height Z-score reduces grade repetitions, but this effect 
becomes positive among relatively tall children.  Again, as in the discussion of grades 
completed, this result can be consistent with both increased opportunity costs of 
schooling investment and possibly understated ages among them. 
Table 6—Grade repetition 
  Cumulative number of grades repeated    Repetition rate 
Dependent (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5) 
Height for age Z-score 1998 
(Haz)  0.0144 0.0463  -0.0222  -0.3018    -0.0604 
 (0.82)  (1.06)  (0.52)  (2.44)    (1.05) 
Haz -1 to 0      0.0432  0.6668    0.1585 
     (0.40)  (2.16)    (1.07) 
Haz 0 to 1      0.1464  0.7940    0.1597 
     (0.98)  (1.87)    (0.81) 
Haz 1 to 2      0.0514  1.4229    0.5291 
     (0.25)  (2.40)    (1.90) 
Haz 2 to 3      0.2859  1.6810    0.4670 
     (1.11)  (2.43)    (1.43) 
Haz 3 to 4      0.3679  2.8266    0.8290 
     (1.16)  (3.20)    (2.01) 
Haz 4 to 5      0.2406  2.5727    0.8517 
     (0.73)  (2.69)    (1.91) 
Haz 5 to 6      0.1018  n.a.    n.a. 
     (0.23)       
Female -0.2858  -0.2491  -0.2904  -0.2263    -0.0871 
 (4.27)  (1.81)  (4.25)  (1.68)    (1.34) 
Current age fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes    yes 
Cluster fixed effects  yes    yes       
Household fixed effects    yes    yes    yes 
R squared  0.3422  0.8715  0.3483  0.8961    0.8838 
Number of observations  347  347  347  347    343 
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are absolute t values. Robust standard errors are used in columns 1 and 3. 
Sample consists of children aged 1 to 5, consistent with 2004 ages, and height-for-age Z-score in 
the range of –6 to 6 in 1998. 
 
Column 5 uses the rate of grade repetition as the dependent variable for checking 
whether the above finding results from an understatement of age.  The rate of repetition is 21 
constructed as the cumulative number of repeated grades divided by the sum of grades 
repeated and completed. Those who show height-for-age Z-scores above the value of one 
are found to experience greater repetition rates, which supports the possibility that 
opportunity costs can be high among them. 
School Fee Expenditure 
Table 7 shows the results on school fee expenditures.  In addition to the height-
for-age Z-score, we include its interaction with total monthly household income in 
1998.
18  In column 1, which controls for cluster fixed effects, the 1998 household total 
monthly income has a positive and significant effect on school fee payment.  The effects 
of the Z-score and its interaction with the initial household income are both insignificant.  
Relatively wealthy households are able to pay more for school fees within clusters. 
Column 2 shows the sibling estimates.  The specification includes the interaction 
between the height Z-score and household income in 1998.  Since the estimation is based 
on household variations of the height Z-score, the 1998 household income is 
exogenous.
19 
While the height Z-score has a positive (marginally significant) effect on school 
fee expenditure, higher household income is found to reduce this effect so that parents 
spend more for relatively short children only if they can afford it. The former effect 
(height) increases income inequality among siblings (given positive returns to height in 
the labor market), while the latter (higher income) reduces inequality among them.  
To detect possible nonmonotonicity, column 3 includes step functions of the 
height-for-age Z-score.  Except for some significant effects from scores of between 3 and 
4, the finding remains robust.  Note that less than 5 percent of the full sample had a Z-
score greater than 3. 
                                                 
18 In preliminary analyses, height-for-age Z-score in sibling estimation was insignificant without its 
interaction with the 1998 total household income, no matter what range of Z-score was used.  Therefore, it 
is important to control heterogeneity of the initial income level. 
19 In a preliminary analysis, the 2004 household monthly income was also interacted with the height Z-
score in 1998, but it was shown to be insignificant. 22 
Table 7—School fee expenditure 1998 
  Dependent:  School fee paid 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Height-for-age Z-score 1998 (Haz)  -15.221  23.147  66.305 
 (1.27)  (1.55)  (3.06) 
Monthly household income 1998  0.0272     
 (1.84)     
Income * Haz  0.0021  -0.0110  -0.0383 
 (0.43)  (2.59)  (5.70) 
Haz 1 to 2      -157.950 
     (1.34) 
Haz 2 to 3      -201.140 
     (0.93) 
Haz 3 to 4      -542.351 
     (2.88) 
Haz 4 to 5      -233.005 
     (0.96) 
Haz 5 to 6      n.a. 
Income * Haz 1 to 2      0.0471 
     (0.96) 
Income * Haz 2 to 3      0.0773 
     (0.71) 
Income * Haz 3 to 4      0.2814 
     (4.62) 
Income * Haz 4 to 5      0.1129 
     (0.66) 
Income * Haz 5 to 6      n.a. 
Age fixed effects  yes  yes  yes 
Cluster fixed effects  yes     
Household fixed effects    yes  yes 
R  squared  0.6531 0.9853 0.9907 
Number  of  observations  341 341 341 
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are absolute t- values. Robust standard errors are used in column 1. Sample 
consists of children aged 1 to 5 in 1998, consistent with 2004 ages, height-for-age Z-score in the 
range of –6 to 6 in 1998, and school fee paid is less than or equal to school fee charged. 
Learning Outcomes 
Tables 8a and 8b report the effects of height for age on mathematics test scores.  
In the 2004 survey, we implemented four types of basic mathematics tests for children 
aged 7 to 9.  There are four questions, one question for each operation: 3 + 5 
(summation), 7 – 3 (subtraction), 2 × 6 (product), and 12 ÷ 4 (division).  For each 23 
question, an indicator is constructed to take the value of one if the answer is correct and 
zero otherwise.
20 
Table 8a—Mathematics test results: Probit with cluster fixed effects 
  Dependent = 1 if correct answer, and 0 otherwise 
 Estimation:  Probit 
Subject Summation  Subtract  Product  Division 
Height-for-age Z-score in 1998  0.1833  0.1538  0.0722  0.0518 
 (2.91)  (2.73)  (1.35)  (0.85) 
Age 8 in 2004  0.8973  0.6822  1.0605  0.7011 
 (3.18)  (2.87)  (4.16)  (2.20) 
Age 9 in 2004  1.2776  1.4943  1.8044  1.4711 
 (3.64)  (5.22)  (6.41)  (4.79) 
Female 0.1683  -0.2899  -0.1835  -0.2673 
 (0.74)  (1.37)  (0.85)  (1.13) 
Cluster fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Pseudo R squared  0.2501  0.2094  0.2826  0.2105 
Number of observations  173  211  210  184 
Notes:  Sample consists of children age 7 to 9 in 2004 and with consistent ages in 1998 and 2004. Numbers 
in parentheses are absolute t- values, using robust standard errors. 
 
Table 8b—Mathematics test results: Linear probability with household fixed effects 
  Dependent = 1 if correct answer, and 0 otherwise 
  Estimation: Linear probability 
Subject Summation  Subtract  Product  Division 
Height-for-age Z-score in 1998 (Haz 98) 0.0837  0.1404  0.0715  -0.0169 
  (2.06) (2.09) (1.11) (0.33) 
Haz 98 * age 8 in 2004  -0.2067  -0.2229  -0.2681  0.0374 
  (1.58) (1.03) (1.29) (0.23) 
Haz 98 * age 9 in 2004  -0.1818  -0.3046  -0.1393  -0.0452 
  (2.10) (2.13) (1.01) (0.42) 
Female  0.0622 0.0564 0.3833 0.0886 
  (0.67) (0.36) (2.58) (0.75) 
Age 2004 fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Household  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R squared  0.6121  0.3172  0.4354  0.4361 
Number  of  observations  260 260 260 260 
Notes:  Sample consists of children aged 7 to 9 in 2004 and with consistent ages in 1998 and 2004.  
Numbers in parentheses are absolute t- values, using robust standard errors. 
 
                                                 
20 Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics. 24 
Table 8a shows Probit results with cluster fixed effects.  There are two 
observations.  First, significantly positive effects are found in summation and subtraction 
(relatively easy computations).  The point estimate decreases as the difficulty of 
calculation advances.  Second, age has a significantly positive effect on the probability of 
answering correctly.  These estimates are again likely to be biased due to omitted 
household factors. 
Table 8b reports sibling estimates, where the effects of the height Z-scores are 
differentiated by age in 2004.  In preliminary analyses, without these age-height 
interactions, we have not found any significant effects of child height.
21  First, it is found 
that in summation and subtraction, height Z-score significantly increases the probability 
of making correct answers among children age 7, but not in the other age groups. 
Interestingly, the effects will decrease as children age.  The lagged nutrition effect is 
significant in the transitional phase from pre-primary to primary school stages. 
6.  Outcomes at the Later Stage of Schooling 
This section summarizes our findings on the effects of the children’s height Z-
score in 1993 on schooling outcomes in 2004.  Before discussing the results, we also 
must note that South African education was in its historical transition from apartheid to 
democracy during the period 1993–96, and the South African School Act and Norms and 
Standards were introduced in 1996, making it compulsory for the school system to be 
nonsegregated.  Due to these social changes, it is also expected that the estimation results 
are subject to imprecision. 
It is also important to note that by 2004, this group of children was also in 
transition from primary to secondary stages of education.  This may create heterogeneity 
by age in the effects of the height Z-score on schooling outcomes.  Therefore, it is equally 
important to examine possible variations in the height effect by age as well as the 
                                                 
21 The finding implies that household factors are positively correlated with both child height and learning 
outcomes (both conditional on age). 25 
nonmonotonicity.  The role of positive returns to health is greater among elder children 
than younger.  
In the analysis of age started school results in Table 9, we expect more 
measurement errors than is the case in the 1998 sample due to recall problems.  Columns 
1 and 2 show sibling estimates (household fixed effect).  The height Z-score has no 
significant effect on age started school in this group.  Column 3, which uses cluster fixed 
effects instead of household fixed effects, shows that a greater height Z-score decreases 
the age they started school for those in the age-14 group (compared with the age-11 
group), who were already age 3 in 1993 (before the political transition).  All these results 
show that girls are likely to start school earlier than boys. 
Table 9—Age started school—1993 sample 
  Dependent variable:  Age started school 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Height-for-age Z-score 1993  0.0467  0.0654  0.0733 
 (0.46)  (0.36)  (1.00) 
* Age 12    0.0904  -0.1193 
   (0.36)  (1.16) 
* Age 13    -0.0696  -0.1529 
   (0.34)  (1.42) 
* Age 14    -0.2339  -0.4033 
   (0.67)  (2.67) 
Female  -0.4273 -0.4949 -0.2604 
 (1.46)  (1.60)  (1.77) 
Age fixed effects  yes  yes  yes 
Cluster fixed effects      yes 
Household fixed effects  yes  yes   
R  squared  0.9338 0.9370 0.4567 
Number  of  observations  230 230 230 
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are absolute t- values.  Robust standard errors are given in column 3.  
Sample consists of children aged 0 to 5, consistent with 2004 ages, and height-for-age Z-score in 
the range of –6 to 6 in 1993. 
 
Table 10 shows the effects of the height-for-age Z-score on grades completed and 
repeated.  All the specifications control household fixed effects.  Column 1 has only the 
height Z-score, which shows its insignificance.  Age heterogeneity is controlled in 
column 2.  It is interesting to know that an improvement in height Z-score marginally 26 
increases years of schooling completed, but it is likely to decrease grades completed as 
they age (conditional on age).  It is possible that greater health capital may discourage 
further schooling from primary to secondary stages, given the positive returns to health in 
the labor market.  To confirm the robustness of this finding, column 3 includes step 
functions of the height Z-score.  Contrary to the previous findings for younger children 
(and cohorts), nonlinearity is not found in the highest grade completed. 
Table 10—Grade completed and repeated—1993 sample 
  Grade completed  Grades repeated 
Dependent (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
Height-for-age Z-score 1993 (Haz)  -0.0149  0.2829  0.2964  0.0227  -0.2904  -0.2887 
 (0.22)  (1.77)  (1.78)  (0.39)  (2.17)  (2.11) 
* Age 12    -0.4861  -0.4933    0.3043  0.3135 
   (2.48)  (2.36)    (1.87)  (1.83) 
* Age 13    -0.3052  -0.2816    0.3469  0.3478 
   (1.71)  (1.46)    (2.33)  (2.16) 
* Age 14    -0.0185  -0.0163    0.4438  0.4495 
   (0.07)  (0.06)    (2.09)  (2.11) 
* Age 15    -0.4692  -0.4743    0.6239  0.6447 
   (1.61)  (1.60)    (2.58)  (2.64) 
* Age 16    -0.2362  -0.1917    0.2526  0.1665 
   (0.74)  (0.59)    (0.91)  (0.58) 
Haz 1 to 2      -0.0653      -0.2382 
      (0.13)    (0.54) 
Haz 2 to 3      0.4461      -0.6461 
      (0.55)    (0.96) 
Haz 3 to 4      -0.6579      0.5029 
      (0.68)    (0.63) 
Haz 4 to 5      n.a.      n.a. 
Haz 5 to 6      n.a.      n.a. 
Female 0.7201  0.7202  0.7383  -0.4398  -0.4161  -0.4280 
 (3.63)  (3.64)  (3.68)  (2.69)  (2.54)  (2.59) 
Age fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes 
Household fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes 
R squared  0.9486  0.9539  0.9545  0.8583  0.8719  0.8755 
Number of observations  379  379  379  377  377  377 
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are absolute t- values. Sample consists of children aged 0 to 5, consistent 
with 2004 ages, and height-for-age Z-score in the range of –6 to 6 in 1993. 
 
Columns 4 to 6 report on grade repetition.  In Column 5, similar to the results on 
grade completion, the height Z-score has a negative effect on the age 11 group, but the 
effect is positive among older groups.  This finding suggests that (conditional on age) 27 
greater health capital may discourage further investments in schooling at the transition 
stage from primary to secondary schools.  Column 6 investigates potential nonlinearity 
by introducing step functions, which again show insignificance of nonlinearity in grade 
repetition. 
In both grades completed and repeated, girls perform better than boys.  However, 
preliminary analysis shows that gender does not matter in the effect of the height Z-score 
on these schooling outcomes. 
Finally, Table 11 reports the effects of the height Z-score on school fee payment.  
Interestingly, the results show opposite signs in the key parameter estimates.  Columns 1 
and 2 use monthly household income in 1993 and 2004, respectively.  In both cases, the 
height Z-score decreases the school fee paid, while an increase in income augments 
school-fee expenditure to healthy children.  The difference between Tables 11 and 7 may 
result from (1) possible differences in the education system that these cohorts 
experienced during this transitional stage of South African education, (2) differences in 
parents’ attitude to school fee expenditure and school choice behavior between early 
primary school and primary-to-secondary school stages.  However, the results show a 
Table 11—School fee expenditure—1993 sample 
  Dependent variable: School fee paid 
  (1) (2) 
Height-for-age Z-score 1993 (Haz)  -245.68  -361.79 
 (1.92)  (3.47) 
Household monthly income 1993 * Haz  0.2153   
 (2.57)   
Household monthly income 2004 * Haz    0.1283 
   (5.16) 
Age fixed effects  yes  yes 
Household fixed effects  yes  yes 
R squared  0.7090  0.7686 
Number of observations  366  329 
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are absolute t- values.  Sample consists of children aged 0 to 5, consistent 
with 2004 ages, height-for-age Z-score in the range of –6 to 6 in 1993, and school fee paid less than 
or equal to school fee charged. 
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process of increasing inequality among children, given positive returns to health capital 
and the positive association between school fee expenditure and school quality. 
7. Conclusions 
This paper examines the effect of early childhood health capital on schooling 
investments and outcomes, using panel data from South Africa.  Good nutrition and 
health in early childhood are thought to be a precondition for child development and 
school learning at subsequent stages.  However, in an environment where children may 
contribute to household income, as in developing countries where health capital has 
positive economic returns in the labor market, child health augments not only the 
efficiency of human capital production at the schooling stage but also the labor-market 
wage.  Therefore the opportunity costs of going to school are higher. 
Nutrition intake and health capital in early childhood, measured by the height-for-
age Z-score of pre-primary-school-aged children, enhance schooling investments and 
improve the outcomes.  That is, children who are well nourished and in good health start 
school at an earlier age, progress further, and repeat fewer grades.  We also found that 
some taller children (Z-score above two) perform worse than shorter children, but since 
this segment of observations is very small in our sample, it is difficult to generalize this 
nonmonotonicity.  Instead, the analysis with a longer panel data of 11 years suggests that 
good health may discourage further investments in schooling at the stage of transition 
from primary to secondary school, when a better health status may reinforce incentives to 
go to work.  In the early stage of schooling, parents attempt to narrow the gaps in total 
human capital and future incomes among siblings by increasing expenditures on 
education for children with smaller health capital as household income increases.  
However, unequal allocation of resources among siblings is found to increase inequality 
at later stages.  This difference may reflect some changes in the education system in 
South Africa during this period, or changes in parents’ behavior that may happen when 
the child moves from primary to secondary school. 29 
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